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In the article there are analyzed the electricity market opening issues in the European 
Union and especially in the Baltic countries. The aim of the article is to find out and 
specify the main challenges for Baltic countries in electricity market liberalization 
process. The Baltic countries are going to face many challenges to secure their 
energy supply and cooperate regionally. For completion of the research task there 
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In 1996 the European Commission observed, that “as far back as 1954, energy was 
regarded as one of the motors of European integration since it is at the heart of 
economic activity and social welfare and because it is a key factor in Community 
solidarity”. This can be illustrated by the fact that two of the three founding treaties 
were primarily concerned with energy matters. In 1951 the Treaty of Paris 
established the European Coal and Steel Community and in 1957 the European 
Atomic Energy Community treaty was signed. 
In 2009 energy policy has become the important topics in Europe, concerning the 
climate change and also the security of supply. Energy security has been traditionally 
defined as ‘The uninterrupted physical availability at a price which is affordable, while 
respecting environment concerns (International Energy Agency). Presently the focus 
is on climate change so that reducing carbon dependence is becoming a policy 
priority number one for many countries, rather than the traditional goal of reducing 
import dependence. The European Union is committed to make drastic reductions in 
its greenhouse gas emissions by transforming the way it uses and supplies energy. 
In its ‘20-20-20’ Climate-Energy legislative package the EU is committed to 
transforming its energy system to achieve a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions, 20% share of renewable energy in total energy consumption (and 10% in 
transportation) and a 20% increase in energy efficiency, all by 2020. 
Although, the energy market liberalization has taken place already for a decade, 
there is still long way to go to have united and integrated European energy market. 
Nordic countries offer good example of the well functioning united electricity market. 
The Baltic countries could follow the Nordic example, especially in regional 
cooperation and in the harmonization of rules. Baltic countries have strong 
interconnections and also the energy-portfolio is diversified enough that is a solid   3
base for the common market. For Baltic countries, the most critical issue is the import 
from the third countries and connections with Scandinavia and Central-European 
area. Both these issues are crucial to secure the electricity supply and functioning 
market in the Baltic countries. 
In Estonia electricity production is based on oil-shale. A key issue of oil shale-based 
energy sector development is the consideration of environmental impacts. As the 
costs on environmental impacts are becoming higher, Estonia will be no longer 
competitive on electricity production, compared for example with Latvia, who is 
producing electricity mainly from renewable sources (hydro). 
Aim of this paper is to explain how to build up a functioning united electricity market 
in Baltic countries. For this purpose following research questions are set up: 
1.  A normative approach to economic regulation concerning the electricity market is 
reviewed. 
2.  Analyze the major trends in the European Union electricity market. 
3. What are the lessons learned from the market opening experience in 
Scandinavia? 
4.  How to build up a functioning united Baltic electricity market? 
In the near future, the Baltic electricity sector is expected to go through major 
changes. Until recent time, the sector was characterized by vertically integrated 
monopolies, but at present the sector is under ongoing reform processes to meet the 
requirements of the EU Directives regarding liberalization of the electricity sectors. 
Latvia and Lithuania have already opened up their electricity markets formally; 
Estonia needs to open its market gradually by 2013. The three Baltic countries have 
to integrate regionally to guarantee the security of supply, reliable market price and 
effective investment environment. Baltic countries have extremely strong 
interconnections with third countries, which could supply over 80% total needed 
electricity into Baltic market area. At the same time, there are only very limited 
interconnections between the Baltic market and the rest of the European Union 
electricity market. The import of electricity produced outside the EU can significantly 
influence the electricity industry in the Baltic countries. With the closing of Ignalina 
nuclear power-plant in Lithuania, Baltic countries are soon facing the lack of 
production capacities in addition to the investments needed in networks.   4
To have the functioning market, Baltic countries need well-developed infrastructure, 
harmonized rules of the game, many market participants, and also common rules to 
deal with the outsiders and future visions. In order to ensure the secure energy 
supply, it is important to integrate Baltic electricity system to the EU electricity 
system. The most important task is to build new interconnections to unite the Baltic-
Sweden and the Baltic-Polish electricity networks, and to synchronize the Baltic 
electricity networks with the Central-European electricity system UCTE. 
Estonia will need to decide on its future of the electricity sector. Whether to build 
nuclear power-plant or invest in new oil-shale power-plants? What will be the CO2 
price in the future and how will it influence the competitiveness of Estonian economy? 
These critical questions need to be answered very soon in order to secure the future 
production capabilities and to be competitive in the liberalized energy market 
conditions. 
 
1. Economic regulation of electricity market 
Above all, talking about the regulation, it has to be considered, that electricity is 
different from the usual commodities. Firstly, there is inability to store power. Without 
the ability to store, a free market will inevitably expose consumers to huge volatility in 
prices. Secondly, there is a need for supply and demand to match at all times. In an 
electricity network, supply and demand must match at all times if the whole system is 
not to collapse. Without this level of control over producers, a system operator does 
not have the tools to ensure security of supply. Thirdly, electricity is a standard 
product, so markets are driven by price. And we add the lack of substitutes, 
environmental impacts and the central role in modern society, it is clear that the 
electricity market shall be regulated very carefully in order to guarantee the security 
of supply (Thomas, 2004). 
The term “regulation” has various definitions. In the article about competition policy in 
regulated industries, Fehr (1998) makes firstly distinction between “economic” or 
“market” regulation and “technical” regulation. Economic regulation would then 
include competition policy, as well as the regulation of natural monopolies. By 
contrast, technical regulation means the qualitative regulation of products or 
production processes, such as imposing industry quality standards or introducing 
measures to promote health and safety. Some authors view last ones as part of 
social regulation. By Hertog (1999) social regulation comprises regulation in the area   5
of the environment, labor conditions (occupational health and safety) and consumer 
protection. Instruments applied here include regulation dealing with the discharge of 
environmentally harmful substances, safety regulations in factories and workplaces, 
the obligation to include information on the packaging of goods or on labels, the 
prohibition of the supply of certain goods or services unless in the possession of a 
permit and banning discrimination. 
Also the connection between competition policy and regulation is not always clear 
enough and is a complex problem. Some kind of rivalry between those two shows up 
in certain phases during the deregulation of an industry or the transformation of 
former state monopolies into competitive markets. As it has been pointed out, in 
practice, the conflict between competition policy and regulation often arises as one 
between competition authorities and sector-specific regulators (Kirchner, 2004). This 
aspect is concerned in case of electricity market as well. 
From institutional economics approach competition policy is seen as an application 
and enforcement of competition law by competition authorities and courts. Regulation 
in this context is as sector-specific regulation enforced by regulatory authorities and 
law courts. Competition policy is public policy instrument to prevent constraints on 
competition. The goal of competition policy is to keep markets free from restrictive 
practices in order to safeguard freedom of choice against business practices which 
have negative welfare effects (Ibid). 
Traditionally, the economic regulation is applied in three following cases: for those 
markets, where it is clear, that competition cannot be achieved by market forces; 
where deviation from efficiency is deemed socially desirable; and where the social 
and private benefits are clearly different. In each of these cases, it is clear that a 
market without intervention will not result in the desired outcome. 
There are primary government tasks which have to be completed in regulated 
sectors. These tasks are as follows (The relationship between … 2005): 
•  Technical regulation: setting and monitoring standards, managing licenses, 
implementing sanctions so as to assure compatibility and to address privacy, 
safety, reliability, financial stability and environmental protection concerns; 
•  Wholesale regulation: ensuring non-discriminatory access to necessary core 
facilities, especially network infrastructures;   6
•  Retail regulation: measures to mitigate monopoly pricing or behavior at the retail 
level; 
•  Public service regulation: measures to ensure that all consumers have access to 
goods that are deemed of special social value, as with universal service 
obligations; 
•  Resolution of disputes: quasi-judicial powers may result in faster resolution of 
disputes than could be provided by a non-specialized court; 
•  Competition oversight: controlling anticompetitive conduct and mergers. 
Applying the framework of structure-conduct-performance paradigm we may illustrate 
connections between economic regulation and competition policy in electricity market 











Figure 1. Competition policy and regulation in the paradigm of structure-conduct-
performance 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
Technical regulations are not generally motivated by imperfect competition as such, 
but rather by other forms of market imperfections, notably incomplete or asymmetric 
information. Technical regulation will in most cases have economic consequences. 
Unlike economic regulation, technical regulation will generally not affect market 
power or the competitive rivalry between firms. In many cases technical regulation 
will mainly mean facilitating the coordination between market participants: for 
example, setting voltage levels in electricity networks. In other cases, technical 
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(ex ante)   7
conditions, such as when setting standards for electricity supply security. In electricity 
market, technical regulation has almost the same meaning as quality regulation. In 
general, quality problems are the result of a mismatch between prior expectations 
and perceived quality of the service. In the context of electricity network industry, the 
following three dimensions are usually distinguished: power quality, commercial 
quality and reliability. (Economides, 2004) 
In electricity retailing, mostly imperfect competition derives from the vertical 
integration between retailing and distribution activities. That is at least the EU 
Commission official statement. The EU Commission report from 2007 shows the 
danger of discrimination and abuse when companies control energy networks as well 
as production or sales, protecting national markets and preventing competition. 
Report claims that such a situation also creates a disincentive on vertically integrated 
companies from investing adequately in their networks, since the more they increase 
network capacity, the greater the competition that exists on their “home market” and 
the lower the market price. The Commission considers that two options might be 
considered to redress this: a full independent system operator (where the vertically 
integrated company remains owner of the network assets and receives a regulated 
return on them, but is not responsible for their operation, maintenance or 
development) or ownership unbundling (where network companies are wholly 
separate from the supply and generation companies). Commission believes that 
ownership unbundling is the most effective means to ensure choice for energy users 
and to encourage investment. This is because separate network companies are not 
influenced by overlapping supply/generation interests as regards investment 
decisions. It also avoids overly detailed and complex regulation and disproportionate 
administrative burdens. 
The independent system operator approach would improve the status quo, but would 
require more detailed, prescriptive and costly regulation and would be less effective 
in addressing the disincentives to invest in networks. 
Vertical integration has many supporters as well. Coase (1937) was the first author, 
who focused on the transaction cost in his paper “The Nature of the Firm”. Coase 
pointed out that a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organising an extra 
transaction within the firm equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by 
means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm.   8
Willliamson is the well-known theorist of transaction costs. Williamson explained why 
companies cooperate and merge vertically. He refers to relationship-specific 
investments that in short-term cause high transaction-costs and in long-term 
agreements increase the power of the partner and favour opportunistic behaviour. 
Willamson explaines that because parties to transactions that are bilaterally 
dependent are “vulnerable” value preserving governance structures—to infuse order, 
thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gain—are sought. Simple market 
exchange thus gives way to credible contracting (to include penalties for premature 
termination, information disclosure and verification mechanisms, specialized dispute 
settlement mechanisms, and the like). Unified ownership (vertical integration) is 
predicted as bilateral dependency hazards successively build up. (Willamson, 2002) 
Vertical integration decreases also the uncertainity caused by partner. Table 1 shows 
the most secure institutional frameworks depending on partner-specific investments 
and level of uncertainty. In case of specific assets and partner, who’s ability to deliver 
may be uncertain, it is reasonable to use vertical integration. 
 





























Source: Klein 2009.    9
Already since the late 1980s, a wave of reform has transformed the institutional 
framework, organization and operating environment of the electricity sector (Jamasb 
et al 2001) as other infrastructure industries in developed and developing countries 
(Guasch et al 1999; Kessides 2004). Even the structure of the power sectors and the 
approach to reform vary, the main objective is to improve the efficiency of the sector. 
The main feature of many power sector reforms has been the market-orientation in 
order to achieve the efficiency objective by using the discipline of the product and 
capital markets to achieve allocative and internal efficiency through competition, 
privatization and the price mechanism (Jamasb et al 2001). As it has been stressed, 
these reforms generally have involved introduction of competition into electricity 
generation, design of organized power markets and unbundling of the electricity 
generation, transmission, distribution, and supply (or retailing) activities. 
Electricity market regulation is extremely important in order to secure the security 
supply and also investments into the new capacities and networks. Unlike 
governments, individual companies carry little or no obligation to address long-term 
energy security or environmental challenges. 
It is the responsibility of governments to ensure, through market pricing and 
legislative frameworks, that the market responds to these concerns. Many countries 
that enthusiastically started liberalizing the electricity markets, have started thinking 
more of the security of supply than the price. 
The searches for the most competitive price have been replaced by the search for 
the most secure solution. 
Countries are adopting incentive regulation to promote efficiency improvement in 
electricity transmission and distribution utilities. Abovementioned issues are still 
relevant for the EU electricity market, including the Baltic electricity market as a part 
of it, liberalization process. Therefore, next we will concentrate on the particular 
issues in the EU more detailed. 
 
2. Electricity market opening in the EU 
The importance of energy is revealed by the mere fact that two of the treaties 
establishing The European Community had energy at their heart: the European Coal 
and Steal Community Treaty of 1951 and the European Atomic Energy Community of   10
1958. The first treaty aimed at creating a common market for coal and steel and 
thereby established interstate and intergovernmental interdependencies that ensured 
economic enhancement and freedom between member-states in order to prevent the 
outbreak of another war. 
For fifteen years the EU has gradually liberalized its energy markets. The long term 
development of the European energy industry is presently influenced by four major 
trends: liberalization and internationalization of the energy markets, strengthening of 
the role of the EU, concerns for climate change and increasing uncertainty over the 
development of fuel prices and concern about security of supply (especially of oil and 
gas). 
According to Percebois (2008) in the EU three objectives are today considered as 
priorities, although their respective importance can vary among countries. These are 
common objectives, but the weight given to each of them is not the same in each 
country, because energy endowment and local constraints are different. 
This is why it is difficult to implement a common energy policy today in Europe. 
These three objectives are: 
1. The search for competitive energy; confidence in the market mechanisms is the 
rule, but the energy access cost must reflect the positive and negative externalities 
and the role of the government should be limited to creating the conditions for 
such an approach through CO, emissions trading, green or white certificates etc. 
2. The search for supply security, in order to give to be priority to national resources 
and to encourage the diversification of imported energy sources. In 2006 the EU 
(25) imported 56% of its energy needs and this rate will increase in the near future. 
3.  The fight against global warming aiming to implement joint and cooperative 
policies among other countries, in the hope of preserving a threatened 
environment considered as a “common public good”. 
The year 2007 was supposed to be a milestone towards an internal energy market: 
while industrial users have had the right to choose between alternative suppliers of 
gas and electricity since July 2004, the final deadline for opening up retail markets 
was July 2007. According to the Commission data, ten of the (then) 25 member-
states had fully opened their markets in late 2006, in the sense that customers were 
entitled by law to swich suppliers (Barysch et al 2007). In practice, only around 10 %   11
of Europeans eligible to choose alternative suppliers actually did so in 2006. Also the 
experience from those countries that liberalized their energy markets long before the 
2007 deadline, such as the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, indicates that it can 
take years before households start changing suppliers (Ibid). 
The competition in wholesale markets has remained limited in many EU countries 
and has been recognized that the original directives were not strong enough to open 
up markets. Table 2 gives an overview about customers market switching in 
Germany, 
France, the UK and Spain in the electricity and gas markets by mid-2005. 
 
Table 2. Market switching: percentage of customers in each category that had 
changed by mid-2005 
 
Country Consumer  group Electricity  Gas 
Germany Big  business  41 * 
  SMEs  7 * 
  Housholds  5 * 
France Big  business  15 14 
  Households  0 0 
Spain Big  business  25 60 
 SMEs  22 60 
 Households  19 2 
UK Big  business  50+ 85+ 
 SMEs  50+ 75+ 
 Households  48 47 
* Germany does not provide data on customer switching in the gas sector. 
Source: European Commission: ’Internal market fact sheets’, 2007. 
The indication of the lack of competition is the strong role of the former, often state-
controlled, monopolies play in many national markets. In some countries, for example 
Finland and Malta, the dominant position of the incumbent is the result of a small 
local market or an isolated location. But in other countries, as France, Greece and   12
Slovenia, slow progress in market opening and absence of real business 
opportunities for newcomes is the main reason (Barysch et al 2007). 
In the electricity sector, France stands out among the big countries as the least open. 
In Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands, competition initially increased after 
market opening, but subsequent consolidation has reduced the number of suppliers 
again. In Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the number of suppliers in each market is 
limited, but generation and transmission tended to be fully unbundeled. Also 
additional competition comes from regional integration in the ‘Nordic power market’ 
(see for more detailed analysis in the following sub-part), which includes Norway as 
well. 
Conclusion here is that the EU market struggles with lot of problems. The European 
Commission sector research (European Commission 2007) brought up five main 
problems in the EU electricity market:  
1. continuing high levels of concentration so incumbents maintain market power; 
2.  vertical foreclosure, as the old monopolists continue to own the energy 
infrastructure; 
3. low levels of cross-border trade, due to insufficient interconnector capacity and to 
contractual congestion since spare physical capacity is not always released;  
4.  lack of transparency about operations in the wholesale energy sector, which 
makes it difficult for new entrants to understand how the markets work in practice 
and the risks that they take on;  
5.  lack of confidence that wholesale energy prices are the result of meaningful 
competition. 
Market power concentration is caused by the market development that has 
stimulated the capital intensive energy companies within the energy sector to grow, in 
particular through mergers and acquisitions across national borders. During the past 
few years, the growth of major European power companies, such as EdF (France), 
RWE Energie (Germany), ENEL (Italy), E:ON (Germany) and several other large 
power companies, have significantly exceeded their market power. That capital 
concentration raises a certain number of questions as according to some observers, 
there is a risk of the emergence of an electro-gas oligopoly, which will control the 
European market and be likely to set monopoly prices. Under high competitive   13
market conditions, capital concentration cannot be avoided: the most competitive 
operators take over the less competitive ones (Percebois, 2008). 
From the enterprises point of view merging has many good aspects. The main 
positive factors arising from the enlargement of enterprises are (Laur et al. 2003): 
•  lower capital costs ensuing from the returns to scale; 
•  more favourable fuel and equipment purchasing possibilities; 
•  possibility of dividing overhead and marketing costs between 
• more  consumers; 
•  possibility of more flexible administration of the structure of 
• production  capacities; 
•  reduced duplication of management and administration activity; 
•  simplified risk administration. 
There is no strict rule how many market participants guarantee the competitive 
market. Market power needs to be strictly supervised by the Competition Authority to 
prevent mergers and acquisitions that could be harmful. 
Vertical foreclosure consists in benefiting from a privileged position on some 
segments of the energy chain likely to restrict the entry of potential competitors. This 
form of barrier to entry arises from a situation where one operator controls an 
essential facility, for example, a transmission network, whose access is essential for 
ail operators, and takes advantage of its position to distort available capacities or to 
make access possible while fixing prohibitive access charges. This is the reason why 
since 2002 the European Commission has required regulated rather than negotiated 
third party access charges to transmission and distribution networks; an independent 
commission is in charge of fixing tariffs according to "objective, clear and non 
discriminatory" criteria. It is also the reason, why Brussels requires, that "use it or 
lose it" rule has to be systematically applied. Brussels insistently requires that the 
network ownership unbundling becomes the rule in Europe, insofar as investment 
decisions on networks would be made by favoring the interest of the incumbent 
operator rather than the market interest. This ownership unbundling requirement is 
questioned by several governments and some producers which have transmission 
and distribution subsidiaries as in France, in Belgium and in Germany.   14
That opposition of operators is due to the fact that regulated activities remain very 
profitable, insofar as the Regulatory Commission attempts to fix network access 
charges which are incentives for operators to invest. (Percebois, 2008) 
Low level of cross-border trade is caused by the lack of interconnections. The 
European electricity market is a set of regional electricity markets, while some of 
these regional markets exhibit a relatively high degree of concentration. EU-25 is 
divided into a number of “electrical islands” areas between which interconnector 
capacities are too limited to allow cross-border trade to equalize prices. (Bergman, 
2009) 
The European Commission sees the lack of interconnections between member-
states as one the main reasons, why there is no single market of electricity. 
Commission states that connecting the remaining isolated energy markets in Europe 
is a priority. The Commission therefore proposes that the following six priority 
infrastructure actions be accepted as Community priorities: 
1. Commission will develop a Baltic Interconnection Plan covering gas, electricity and 
storage in 2009. This will identify the key missing infrastructures necessary for the 
effective interconnection of the Baltic region with the rest of the EU. 
2. A southern gas corridor must be developed for the supply of gas from Caspian and 
Middle Eastern sources, which could potentially supply a significant part of the 
EU’s future needs. This is one of the EU’s highest energy security priorities.  
3. Liquefied natural gas and adequate gas storage are important in providing liquidity 
and diversity to EU gas markets. Sufficient LNG capacity consisting of liquefaction 
facilities in the producing countries and LNG terminals and ship-based 
regasification in the EU should be available to all Member States, either directly or 
through other Member States on the basis of a solidarity arrangement. 
4. A Mediterranean energy ring now needs to be completed, linking Europe with the 
Southern Mediterranean through electricity and gas interconnections. 
5. North-South gas and electricity interconnections within Central and South-East 
Europe need to be developed. 
6. In line with the work of the European coordinator and the Communication on 
Offshore Wind tabled by the Commission together with this Strategic Energy 
Review, a Blueprint for a North Sea offshore grid  should be developed to 
interconnect national electricity grids in North-West Europe together and plug-in   15
the numerous planned offshore wind projects. It should become, together with the 
Mediterranean Ring and the Baltic Interconnection project, one of the building 
blocks of a future European super grid. 
Lack of transparency about operations in the wholesale energy sector and lack of 
competition can be solved by strengthening regulation and harmonization of rules as 
the sector inquiry confirms (European Commission, 2007). Europe needs a 
substantial strengthening of the powers of regulators and enhanced European 
coordination. Commission finds that only a strengthened regulatory framework can 
provide the transparent, stable and non-discriminatory environment that the sector 
needs for competition to develop and for future investments to be made. European 
Commission finds that main ingredients of such a strengthened framework should be: 
•  enhanced powers for independent national energy regulators,  
•  reinforced coordination between national energy regulators,  
•  reinforced cooperation between transmission system operators (TSO),  
•  substantially enhanced consistency of regulation in cross-border issues. 
Commission has stated also that reinforced coordination between national energy 
regulators, with a stronger role for community oversight to ensure the internal market 
interests, particularly as regards cross-border issues and areas most critical for 
market entry, will be necessary to overcome the current regulatory cross-border gap 
which cannot be remedied by application of competition rules alone. 
Today energy markets liberalization has redirected its focus to the most secure 
solutions with the less environmental impacts. Energy policy has become the most 
important issue in the EU foreign policy and member-states are more and more 
interested in common energy policy that can provide the whole union with the secure 
supply of electricity. Clear action plan is made in order to build the connections 
between the countries: the EU-25 is divided into a number of “electrical islands” 
areas between which interconnector capacities are too limited to allow cross-border 
trade and to have the functioning market. 
EU has clearly stated in the third energy package to take actions to form a real 
functioning market: that is balanced, diversified, secure and environmentally 
sustainable. 
   16
3. Lessons learned from opening up the electricity markets in Scandinavia 
All Nordic countries have liberalized their electricity markets, opened electricity 
trading and electricity production to competition. In the past, each of the four Nordic 
countries the national electricity market exhibited a high degree of concentration, with 
a publicly owned power company having a dominating position. The first step towards 
the creation of the Nordic market was taken in 1996, when the border tariffs between 
Norway and Sweden were abolished and the common power exchange (Nord Pool) 
was established. Finland joined the market in 1998 and the process was completed 
in 2000 when Denmark was fully integrated into the Nord Pool system (Bergman, 
2009). 
The creation of Nord Pool and the elimination of border tariffs between the Nordic 
countries were key elements in a strategy aiming at an integrated Nordic market for 
electricity. Nord Pool operates both a common power exchange (a sport market) and 
forward markets for electricity. Around 30 per cent of the total electricity consumption 
in the Nordic area is traded on the Nord Pool spot market, while the total forward 
market turnover amounts to about five times the spot market trade. The day-ahead 
wholesale markets acts as a single market when the grids allow it, while a shared 
mechanism for allocating interconnections divides them again into distinct zones 
when the grid becomes overloaded. The rules and regulations governing 
transmission pricing and interconnector congestion management ensure the efficient 
functioning of the market. The prices of transmission services are independent of the 
location, and of the distance between, buyers and sellers, and interconnector 
congestion fees are positive only when net demand exceeds capacity. There are still 
four national transmission system operators (TSO), but from the point of view of the 
functioning of the common market there is a very close cooperation between them. 
There is also an efficient flow of relevant information about expected load and 
interconnector capacity utilization between the TSOs and Nord Pool. (Ibid) 
Nordic market offers many positive examples of liberalization. One example is from 
the critical issue: whether an unregulated generation and supply industry can survive 
the potential back-lash from a period of high prices caused by shortages (in this case, 
of rain for the hydro reservoirs). Both Norway and Sweden suffered from a supply 
shock in 2002-03, due to unexpectedly dry weather. In the second half of 2002, 
inflow to hydro reservoirs was only 54% of the average of the proceeding 20-year   17
period. Foreseeing tighter market conditions, producers began restricting supply in 
late autumn and prices started to rise. The daily average spot price peaked at normal 
850 NOK/MWh (115 EUR/MWh) in January 2003, two to three times in the normal 
level. Many customers received electricity bills which were 50% higher than usual. 
There was speculation that high prices were the result of abuse of market power, as 
well as a lack of investment in both generation and transmission in earlier years, and 
that rationing on a massive scale would be required. As it turned out, no such drastic 
measures were needed, as responses from consumers and thermal-power producers 
balanced the market. Even though prices remained high during most of 2003, market 
conditions gradually normalized. The Nordic experience suggests that consumers 
can reduce demand appreciably in response to sustained increases in electricity 
prices, provided the wholesale prices feed through into retail prices and are not 
distorted by market power supported by high switching costs. When the reasons for 
high prices are clear and understood (low reservoir levels) there appears to be no 
need for regulatory intervention. (Newbery, 2009) 
Second good example can be brought from the “national interests” that sometimes 
are brought as one the obstacles in creating one united market. In the context of the 
shared management of Nordic interconnections, simultaneously defined the effective 
size of their common market and the volume of energy allowed to transit between the 
submarkets during periods of market splitting. The Swedish TSO; which is not really 
a firm, but a government body, is apparently obligated to prioritize Swedish interests 
when the conflict with the optimal usage of the Nordic common market. The 
advantage of the Swedish example is transparency– things are stated with such 
clarity among partners sharing a common wholesale market. (Glachant et al. 2009) 
Nordic countries are the ones that have also progressed in the development of 
incentive pricing structures which as a result leads to the competitive market. The 
grid access fee no longer consists of only annual fee covering all TSOs expenses 
(except the costs of balancing) and in which access to the grid is no longer free for 
generators. It is considered differently in France and Germany, where the consumer 
basically pays all the costs for the whole service. It is difficult to imagine how a 
competitive market can function smoothly in the long term using such costly 
infrastructure (60% of the wholesale price of energy) without delivering appropriate 
economic signals to the market operators. (Ibid)   18
As the most of EU suffers from the high concentration of producers, Nordic countries 
also here offer quite good example: for instance, Vattenfall’s share of the relevant 
market has been reduced from around 50% to around 20% by geographically 
extending the market. Integration has managed to eliminate potential market power. 
The factors listed below, seem to have been instrumental in preventing market power 
from being established, maintained and exercised in the Nordic electricity market 
(Newbery, 2009): 
1. A low degree of concentration – as a result of market integration, the degree of 
concentration is low.  
2. Competition policy - prevention of mergers and acquisitions that could be harmful. 
3. Forward contracting 
4. Clear market rules 
5. A significant share of hydropower in the generation mix. 
If Norway and Sweden are being compared, where regulations are similar, the retail 
markets nevertheless seem to perform quite differently. Average retail prices were 
considerably lower in Norway than Sweden in the early period, and the explanation 
lies in the switching costs. Norway used profiles to determine bills while Sweden 
required expensive interval meters to switch to a new supplier until it moved to 
profiling in 1999, after which retail prices moved towards Norwegian levels. Well-
functioning retailing market is characterized by the following points (Bergman, 2009): 
1. Free entry on the supplier side – any prospective company is free to start trading 
electricity; 
2. A low degree of supplier concentration; 
3. Transparent prices and conditions for electricity offered; 
4. Free choice of supplier and contracts; 
5. No charge for switching suppliers. 
As the result of this there has been a greater volatility of average residential end-
users prices along with this development, reflecting the monthly, seasonal and 
annual variation of spot prices. Furthermore, there have been fewer variations in the 
contract prices offered to consumers, indicating increasing competition between 
suppliers. Customers may freely choose a contract from a new supplier directly on 
the internet and the engaged company will take care of the necessary changes   19
(cancellation of old contracts etc.). Customers may choose among three board 
categories of contracts reflecting various degrees of price risk: fixed price contracts, 
spot price contracts and variable tariff contracts. Fixed price contracts may be various 
lengths (one year of three years) 64% of the household prefer contract where the 
tariff may be changed at short notice (14 days) (Ibid). 
Nordic electricity market is considered to be one of the most successful ones in 
Europe. The united market has been able to keep in balance also in case of 
shortages. The rules and regulations governing transmission pricing and 
interconnector congestion management ensure the efficient functioning of the 
market. There are four national TSOs, but clear and transparent rules guarantee 
effective cooperation between. The conditions for consumers allow to flexibly switch 
the suppliers and to choose from different categories of contracts. Nordic countries 
have also managed to eliminate the threat of market power concentration. Baltic has 
a lot to learn from Nordic, especially in sense of cooperation between the countries 
as well the flexibility towards the customer. 
 
4. Electricity market opening in the Baltic countries 
In the years to come, the Baltic electricity sector is expected to go through major 
changes. Recently, the sector was characterized by vertically integrated monopolies, 
but at present the sector is undergoing reform processes to meet the requirements of 
the EU Directives regarding liberalization of the electricity sectors. 
Baltic electricity markets peak load is nearly 5000 MW, having 3 million customers 
with consumption of 27 TWh/year. There are 3 large national utilities, plus 300 small 
and medium independent producers. There is no internal bottlenecks, 350 MW 
connection to Finland and over 3000 MW connections to Russia. Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania are part of BRELL ring, which connects the Baltic, Belarus and Northwest 
Russia. The Baltic States’ electricity network is often described as an island in the 
European  Union. There is only one transmission link with the rest of the EU, cable 
connecting Estonia to Finland. Transmission capacity with Russia is on the other 
hand well developed, because the electricity grid of the Baltic countries is integrated 
into the North-West Russian grid for historical reasons. This is a cause for serious 
concern, although so far no serious incidents with political undertones have taken 
place, contrary to recent events in the supply of natural gas.   20
Estonia and the other Baltic states are among the countries most dependent on 
external energy sources. A problematically big amount of Estonian, Lithuanian and 
Latvian energy comes from Russia, one way or another. As regards energy issues, 
the three Baltic states are rather bound, and in quite a similar situation. (Mälk, 2007) 
Degree of market opening (implementation of Directive 2003/54/EC) is different in 
three countries: Latvia and Lithuania have formally opened their electricity market, 
but Estonia is going to do it in the nearby future. Baltic markets act separately and as 
already the history has shown regarding the Ignalina nuclear power-plant, it is very 
hard to reach the common understanding about united action. 
The Estonian electricity sector is organized around a vertically integrated utility – 
Eesti Energia AS – a state-owned enterprise that controls the generation, distribution 
as well as detail sales throughout almost all of the country. Formally all business 
units are separated. In 2009 the separation of transmission system operaator Elering 
from Eesti Energia started and it will be 100% direct state ownership by 2010 at the 
latest. 
Estonia will open 35 % of its market in 01.04.2010 and 100% probably by year 2013. 
All business-consumers (over 2 GWh) have to buy electricity from the stock-market 
starting from 01.04.2010. Stock-market will allow also the Russian electricity to enter 
the market. At the moment there are 4 licensed electricity-sellers in the Estonia and 
active research is being done also by the Nordpool market participants. 
In Latvia, the real market opening has taken place in the amount of 55% (of total end 
consumption), as customers with turnover more than 10 MEUR or more than 50 
employees have to purchase electricity for the market price. There is also a kind of 
discrimination for the newcomers: network tariff has been raised only for new 
supplier’s customers, while tariff for old supplier’s customers have remained the 
same 01.08.2007 the transmission tariffs were increased and 01.02.2008 the 
distribution tariffs were increased. Up to 01.04.2008 customers purchasing from new 
supplier should use higher network tariffs and customers of old supplier enjoyed old 
lower tariffs. Network operator asked from new supplier’s customers to pay for 
additional metering equipment to be installed due to switching of supplier. Producers 
get subsidies only if they sell electricity to old supplier. Regulated cost-based tariffs 
are still available for all customers. Majority of small producers do not sell electricity 
to the market because of loosing subsidies. New suppliers are not interested to enter   21
because of higher tariffs in network services and huge risks in delivery forecasting. 
Foreign producers and suppliers cannot access to the market because of restrictions 
in cross-border trading. Latvenergo has the only open supply agreement over Latvian 
border, instead of TSO. No other trader has right to do so. (Arukaevu, 2008) 
In Lithuania, the spot-market started operating on the 1
st of January, 2010. The 
Ignalina nuclear-station was closed in the end of 2009 and this raised the price of 
electricity reasonably. The price jumped from 20 €/MWh to 52 €/MWh within a first 
week. Currently, nearly 30% of the whole electricity need is covered by the import 
from Russian. There are 20 participants in the spot-market. Before 2010, the 
electricyt market was also opened only formally. For example: new supplier was 
obliged to submit delivery plans separately for each customer: so this means that 
having 100 customers the new supplier had to send 100 separate delivery plans. At 
the same time, old supplier had to send only one delivery plan in the same case. Also 
as in Latvia, majority of small producers do not sell electricity to the market because 
of loosing subsidies and new suppliers are not interested to enter because of higher 
tariffs in network services and huge risks in delivery forecasting. For import and 
export permit are needed and there is no clear procedure how to conduct import and 
export. Also there is a mandatory auctioning of electricity imported or exported by 
traders. (Ibid) 
One big problem for the Baltic region is the possible import from third countries. 
Lithuania is already having debates whether they should negotiate with Russia from 
special agreements for buying electricity. Baltic countries have already extremely 
strong interconnections with third countries, which could supply over 80% total 
needed electricity into Baltic market area. The import of electricity produced outside 
the European Union can significantly influence the electricity industry in the Baltic 
countries. 
To prevent market failure and support fair competition in the European Union energy 
market, Estonian Government has proposed that electricity import has to be part of 
the emission trading system. Otherwise, there could be a situation where a 
neighboring non-EU state creates an unknown amount of greenhouse gas emissions 
in electricity production that is sold to the internal market. This may also motivate the 
EU companies to transfer their production into third countries, which will increase 
carbon leakage. The second reason creating a demand for electricity import control is   22
possible market distortion. Electricity produced in third countries under lower 
environmental requirements is likely to be of less cost compared to electricity 
produced in internal market. Producers that are obliged to meet environmental 
requirements and EU climate policy cannot compete on equal grounds with those 
who have no such obligations. It would be unfair to give third country producers with 
lower environmental and production quality standards advantage over producers 
within the internal market. Estonia proposed that for third countries the custom-tariff 
would be in the same amount as the CO2 quota bought from the action. 
Currently there is a discussion on common regulation in the EU, how to approach the 
issues of electricity imports from third countries. Liberalization of power markets and 
emission trading scheme has made it very attractive for the third countries’ power 
producers to enter these markets with their power suppliers and for the member 
states difficult to apply any measures against such imports. Mitchell (2009) finds in 
his article „ Europe’s Energy Security After Copenhagen: Time for a Retrofit?” that 
this question could be in principle solved in the farme of World Trade Organization 
(WTO). According to him, solution has become more relevant than earlier, as now the 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Countries are members, as are the South 
American exporters. The big exceptions are Russia, Iraq, Libya and Algeria. If and 
when these countries join the WTO, their accession would provide some opportunity 
to negotiate matters affecting energy security (Mitchell, 2009). The vice-counsellor of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications opposes it, saying that Estonia 
itself made several proposals to the chairman and the Commission for solving the 
problem, but the rules of the WTO prohibit any restrictions to the electricity trade. 
(Kisel, 2008) 
The possible future for Baltic states would be creating a joint Nordic-Baltic energy 
market that would be efficient, provide energy security, and reduce the environmental 
impact of energy production. 
For developing a joint well-functioning electricity market, it is important to link the 
Baltic and Nordic countries with new interconnections and simultaneously ensure the 
smooth functioning of the Baltic electricity market. Current regulation in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania does not support the development of a joint efficient electricity 
market. With the help of different regulatory schemes, Baltic countries have been   23
supporting domestic electricity producers, thus significantly distorting the 
development of a joint electricity market. (Kisel, 2008)  
Baltic countries could form united market similarly to the Nordic countries (Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark) that merged their electricity markets building on the 
systems created in Norway in 1991. Like the Nordic market that had many 
advantages: national systems were complementary in resource terms (Norway is 
hydro based while Denmark is fossil-fuel based with Sweden and Finland using a 
mix); Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have diverse energy mix in electricity generation 
by technology and fuel. 
One of the important issues is also the investments into new generating capacities, 
as the Baltic region is starting from 2010 facing a lack of generation facilities. The 
early experience with reforms during the 1990s suggested that competitive wholesale 
markets could and would mobilize adequate investment in new generating capacity. 
Substantial amounts of capitals were mobilized during the late 1990s to support 
constructions of new efficient generating capacity in many countries that have 
implemented the reform. About 40% of the stock of generating plants in service in 
England and Wales was replaced with modern efficient combined-cycle gas turbine 
(CCGT) technology between 1990 and 2002 as old coal-burning generators have 
been closed and expensive dirty coal plants have been displaced by cheaper and 
cleaner CCGT capacity. On the other hand, many EU countries entered the 
liberalization era with excess generating capacity and are only now facing „supply 
security“ issues that may arise if competitive markets do not provide adequate 
incentives to stimulate investment in new generating facilities consistent with 
economic and reliability goals. (Glachant el al. 2009) 
Latvia and Lithuania have opened up their markets, Estonia needs to do that by 
2013. The three Baltic countries have been unable to coordinate their electricity 
markets so far, though each of them is small and very simply structured. 
Baltic countries need to consider what would be the best for the whole region and 
take the needed steps in order to move the barriers from united electricity market at 
least by 2013. Also, the cooperation has to be done to face the future lack of 
production capacities. In order to have the functioning market, Baltic countries need 
clear and harmonized rules, many market participants and common future visions. 
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Conclusion 
The third energy packet that was approved by the European Parliament in December 
2008 pointed out the non-functioning united market need for common energy policy 
in the EU. Mainly the market is non-functioning as the European electricity market is 
a set of regional electricity markets. EU-25 is divided into a number of “electrical 
islands” areas between which interconnector capacities are too limited to allow cross-
border trade to equalize prices. Besides that, quite many of these regional markets 
exhibit a relatively high degree of concentration. Common energy policy of EU is 
extremely important for Baltic countries as it includes also the rules for electricity 
import for the third countries, which is the potential threat. As a bottom line, today 
energy markets liberalization has redirected its focus from search for the lowest price 
to search for the most secure solutions and well the search for diversified sources of 
energy that could provide the supply even in case of war or crises. Energy policy has 
become the most important issue in the EU foreign policy and member-states are 
today more interested in common energy policy that can provide the whole union with 
the secure supply. 
The three Baltic countries have much to learn from the Nordic neighbors. First of all, 
the regional cooperation in the form of Nord Pool that enables to secure the supply 
also in case of shortages. As in Nordic countries, Baltic countries should also unite 
their main grids into one unit and operate this in cooperation. Clear and transparent 
rules need to be introduced, to avoid possible “national interests” conflicts. Secondly, 
Nordic countries have well-functioning retail market that is flexible towards the 
customer. 
Baltic countries could logically form one united regional electricity market. There are 
strong interconnections and also the energy-portfolio is diversified enough (oil-shale, 
hydro, nuclear). 
Similarly to Nordic energy market, Baltic market could have one spot market and the 
main grids should be united into one unit. The common market starts from 
harmonizing the rules. Firstly there is a need to remove formal and informal barriers 
from electricity markets so that export and import could take place freely. Next step 
would be harmonization agreements between regulators (rules for reserves and 
balancing, access to interconnections and congestion management, compatibility of 
access and connection fees, joint approval of investments in the grid). Baltic   25
countries need also consider the possible cooperation in the sense of production 
capacities. Lithuania is facing the lack of capacities already at the beginning of year 
2010. Lithuania is capable of producing the half of the electricity need and the rest is 
planned to buy from the open market. This could either speed up the formulation of a 
common market or either increases the Lithuania’s dependency on the Russian 
energy. Baltic countries have a good possibility to start thinking and acting in united 
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